In December 2010, Egypt Independent spoke to different political pundits to probe them for their 2011 predictions as part of an annual press ritual. Back then, many had predicted that Hosni Mubarak’s regime would soon initiate a crackdown on the nation’s largest opposition group, the Muslim Brotherhood, to tighten its grip over the political scene in the lead-up to the would-be 2011 presidential elections. It was suspected that Mubarak Junior would take over despite growing opposition to hereditary succession.
These experts spoke only a few weeks after the fraudulent 2010 parliamentary poll from which the Brotherhood emerged empty-handed. Mubarak’s police rigged the vote to ensure that Islamists would not garner or advance on their 2005 gains when they won 88 out of 444 contested seats.
In December 2010, even the most seasoned experts could not imagine that in a few weeks a sweeping uprising would culminate in Mubarak’s ouster and the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood as the lead civilian player for the first time in the organization’s 83-year history.
As 2011 comes to an end, it is safe to say that the Brotherhood will constitute the largest bloc in the first post-Mubarak parliament. So far, they have garnered almost 40 percent of the votes in the first and second rounds and similar results are expected for the third round on 3 January.
Despite the group’s violations of some campaigning rules, most analysts agree that the Brotherhood’s electoral triumph is well-deserved. For decades, the group has invested in consolidating support nationwide and its political and social discourse, which stresses a relatively moderate Islamic identity, resonates with large segments of Egypt’s conservative society.
The victory poses a plethora of new challenges for the Brotherhood, putting them to the test amid unprecedented political turmoil. Soon enough, the largest parliamentary bloc will have to handle three resilient political players: ultraconservative parliamentarians, revolutionaries and generals.
The Salafi pressure: Tailing or leading?
The conservative Salafi Nour Party has risen as the first runner-up in the ongoing poll, winning nearly 25 percent of the votes in the first round and 30 percent in the second.
The surprising ascent of ultra-orthodox Islamists is expected to impact Brotherhood politics. Pessimists argue that Salafis will drag the Brotherhood further to the right of the political spectrum and end hopes that the latter will temper its Islamist ideology with moderate political policies.
Others contend that the Brotherhood will distance itself from Salafis, continue to present itself as a mainstream political party with a moderate interpretation of Islam and seek to build bridges with liberals. These experts hold that Brotherhood lawmakers will not let Salafis compel them to issue legislation obliging women to wear the veil, banning liquor, revolutionizing the banking system, or imposing stringent restrictions on tourist behavior.
The Brothers and the revolutionary bloc: Continuous disengagement?
While young revolutionaries frequently demonstrate to pressure the ruling military council for various democratic reforms, the Brotherhood has a different approach. The organization seeks to shift attention away from street politics and to parliamentary action. “Elections is the solution” was the slogan that headlined the group’s daily paper in late November while the Central Security Forces assaulted protesters in downtown Cairo to quell a five-day demonstration. The group refused to throw its full support behind a march that activists organized in response to police brutality. At the time, observers said the Brotherhood was trying to avoid a confrontation with the military that would give it an excuse to crackdown on the group, just as generals did in 1954.
The organization adopted the same withdrawn stance during clashes on Qasr al-Aini Street in mid-December, despite the local and international outrage over scenes of soldiers firing and throwing rocks at and urinating on protesters from rooftops, beating women and stripping at least one near Tahrir Square.
The group adopted similar rhetoric to military rulers, alleging that some unknown third party was trying to sabotage elections and instigate chaos. Through its daily newspaper, the group launched a campaign against the Revolutionary Socialists and other activist groups, dismissing them as “anarchical” and saying they planned to destroy the state. Revolutionaries’ online social media platforms are swarming with criticism that the Brotherhood is siding with the military rather than the revolution, forsaking the martyrs for political opportunism.
Soon enough, the revolutionaries will exert pressure on Islamist MPs, who will also face the majority’s expectations of improved security and economic stability. If the Brotherhood fails to take on Egypt’s draconian security apparatus and reverse a deep-rooted legacy of human rights violations, ensure fair and prompt trials for former officials, or satisfy the demands of martyrs’ families, revolutionaries have proved themselves capable of causing turmoil.
The Brothers and the military: Inevitable collision?
The relationship between the ruling military council and the Brotherhood has seen ebbs and flows since Mubarak’s resignation. Earlier this year, some observers alleged that the two parties had struck a secret deal allowing the military to maintain its privileges under a civilian government in exchange for an Islamist-dominated parliament and cabinet. The council’s appointment of Tarek al-Beshri, a jurist known for his Islamist tendencies, and Sobhi Saleh, a Muslim Brotherhood lawyer, to the committee to amend the old constitution and create a roadmap for the transition period was seen as an early indicator of such an alliance.
The Brotherhood was seen as the primary beneficiary of the roadmap that stipulated parliamentary elections would precede the new parliament’s selection of a constituent assembly that would draft the constitution. Liberals decried the plan, arguing that early elections would guarantee Islamists sweeping victories and hence the upper hand in writing the constitution.
A few months later, the military sought to circumvent this plan after tens of thousands of Islamists rallied in Tahrir Square in July, calling for the establishment of an Islamic state. To defuse the fears of secular and Coptic Egyptians, the military put forward a set of “supra-constitutional documents” that would thwart any attempt to establish a theocracy in Egypt, while, at the same time, ensuring the armed forces full political and budgetary autonomy from elected civilian bodies.
The document elicited a stir and instigated the first collision between the generals and Islamists. On 18 November, the Muslim Brotherhood called for a protest demanding the withdrawal of the document. Most liberal forces also dismissed the decree, arguing it would cement military rule over the country.
Later, the document was withdrawn, but the military did not back off completely. It established the so-called “Advisory Council.” Brothers boycotted it, suspecting that the generals created the council to interfere with the process of writing the new constitution. They insisted that the military must respect the will of an elected parliament, which according to the roadmap would have the exclusive right to determine members of the constituent assembly.
Is a collision course betweeb the Islamists and the generals inevitable?
"I do not believe in the collision scenario. I believe they will reach a compromise," he said. "The Muslim Brotherhood has already made a lot of gains. The group will not sacrifice these gains by clashing [with the military]," said Khalil al-Anani, expert on Islamist politics with Durham University.
The ongoing tension does not warn of a collision; it is mere attempts by the Muslim Brotherhood to enhance their position before they start negotiating the tenets of the new political order with the military elite, he added.
He added that the Muslim Brotherhood would not rubberstamp constitutional clauses that grant the military a privileged position over elected bodies. Otherwise, the group might lose legitimacy and earn accusations of openly turning against the revolution.
Yet, both parties can reach a tacit agreement whereby the armed forces’ social and economic privileges would remain untouched. Even non-Islamist political parties would not object to this arrangement, Anani concluded.
