Salafism is becoming the new bogeyman in Egyptian politics. The Islamist mass rally in Tahrir Square on 29 July, which was dominated by Salafis, showed just how intolerant some political forces in post-Mubarak Egypt can be. No, I don’t mean the Salafis, but rather some liberal and secular groups that are keen on excluding Islamist voices from Egypt’s new political arena. These groups not only demonize Salafis as a regressive current that aims to destroy the revolution and build a new dictatorship, they also deny their right to share Tahrir Square, a space of public dissent for all Egyptians.
Instead of tolerating Egypt’s long-repressed Islamists and building normal relations with them, many liberals and secularists attacked Salafis for chanting religious slogans in Tahrir Square, while others chose to withdraw from the rally.
The sudden emergence of political Salafism in the wake of the revolution shows how much Egypt has changed, yet it also highlights the extent to which newcomers to the political arena can be made to feel unwelcome. Sure, the overwhelming presence of Salafis (many of whom opposed the revolution at the start) can be provocative. But there’s nothing that shocking about Salafis raising conventional Islamic slogans, like “Islamyyia, Islamyyia”, or calling for the implementation of Sharia Law. Such chants are within the bounds of their freedom of speech. What’s more striking, indeed frustrating, is when some liberals and secularists use the same fear-mongering tactics as the Mubarak regime to demonize Islamists, rather than engage with them.
“Salafobia” obscures significant transformations taking place within the Salafi movement.
First, since the fall of Mubarak, three Salafi political parties – Al-Nour (The Light), Al-Fadilah (The Virtue), and Al-Asala (Authenticity) – have been formed. So far, they seem to adopt democratic political views and are willing to reach out to secular and liberal forces. None of these parties espouse violence as a political tactic.
Second, the Salafi bloc is not a monolith. True, some Salafi leaders take a hostile stance towards democracy and secular parties, but others – especially younger Salafis – tend to be more moderate and pragmatic.
Third, and most important, many Salafis groups are now inclined towards integration into the political process. By excluding them, they may adopt more aggressive means to assert their political presence. There’s a need to pull Salafism from the ideological periphery into the political center. If this happens, Egyptian Salafism can become less dogmatic and more open.
Most Salafis who went to Tahrir Square did so to counter-balance the power of emerging secular forces. They reject the adoption of any “supra-constitutional” principles prior to the elections, seeing this as an undeserved reward for liberals who feel bitter about losing the constitutional referendum. They also oppose any delays to the parliamentary elections, slated for November. In short, Salafis feel threatened that liberal maneuvers will come at their expense, ideologically and politically.
The conflict between secularists and Islamists is not just ideological, but also social. Salafis and their supporters come mainly from the Egyptian lower middle class, especially in smaller towns and rural areas, that has been alienated from official politics for the past three decades. Like any other political group, they’re now fighting for their fair share in the post-Mubarak era. The Salafi-secularist divide represents a conflict of interests over how to re-construct Egypt’s political system, rather than an irreconcilable clash of ideologies. For this reason, Egypt’s Salafis should be talked to, not feared.
Khalil Al-Anani is a scholar at Middle East Institute at Durham University and expert on Islamist Politics. His latest book is The Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt: Gerontocracy Fighting against the Clock (Shorouk Press 2008).
