
An investigation into the failings of the Israeli military in the lead-up to the devastating Hamas attack of October 7, 2023, has highlighted gaps in intelligence gathering, flawed assumptions about Hamas, and “systemic” failures in the Israel Defense Force’s preparedness and response.
The 19-page report released Thursday by the IDF said there were gaps in the Intelligence Directorate’s understanding of “Hamas’ strategic goals, decision-making processes,” and operational plans that contributed to its failure to stop the biggest terrorist attack in the country’s history, when gunmen killed more than 1,200 people and took more than 250 hostage.
Despite having relevant information, the intelligence community failed to recognize Hamas’ shift from a “determined,” and “pragmatic” group to one actively planning a large-scale offensive, it said.
The report said that as early as 2016, Hamas had begun preparing for “a large-scale attack” aimed at breaching the Gaza border, “occupying Israeli territory,” and causing mass casualties.
It identified several instances where intelligence indicators, such as Hamas’ “training exercises” and operational plans, were “misinterpreted” or dismissed as “unrealistic.”
These indicators, had they been properly analyzed, could have revealed Hamas’ intentions, the report said.
Hamas had deliberately created “a false perception of seeking quiet,” while accelerating its military buildup, the report said, adding that by May 2023 the militant group had decided to carry out an attack during a Jewish holiday that would aim “to shatter Israel’s sense of security” and potentially escalate “into an all-out war aimed at destroying Israel.”