When parliamentary elections produces a clear majority of a specific political orientation, whether through a party or coalition, the house performs its duties better. In this way, the majority can support the government with plans that help it move forward rather than maintain a status quo, irrespective of whether that status is appropriate or not.
But the electoral system for the coming parliament does not portend a strong balance of power that would be able to concert efforts and build institutions, particularly in a difficult phase with an accumulated legacy of nearly four decades of authoritarianism, corruption, mismanagement and an influential wealth that allied with power.
The next parliament is expected to be fragmented among a large number of political parties, groups and individuals in a manner closer to a balance of weakness, and not power because of the list-based electoral system. For in the absence of large political parties and local councils, the candidates that have financial and clan influence have the better chance to win.
Thus was the case before the 25 January revolution when the National Democratic Party (NDP) derived its strength from the power and the wealth of the regime. It was more of a gathering of an interest group than a political party, as such with an express direction based on a vision. And when that gathering grew bigger, competing over parliamentary elections lacked any objective standard or qualification. The elections were turned into a fighting arena between fielded NDP candidates and NDP independent runners, under a regime that considered Egypt its private property with no place for anyone else.
It was not surprising in light of such an imbricate condition that the NDP failed to reach a majority, as its official candidates won only 34 percent of the seats in 2000 and 38 percent in 2005, prompting the party’s independent runners to join the NDP bloc to empower it.
If that bad electoral system produced a parliament without a majority in the presence of a party with a large interest group, what happens in the absence of such a party?
Albeit difficult to project, maybe the revolutionary parties and the traditional parties whose majority is of former NDP and former regime members would respectively win 20 percent or a bit more, while the political Islamist parties would win 5 to 8 percent of the seats.
And so the seats would fragment among 10 or 20 revolutionary and traditional parties and two political Islam parties, namely the Nour Party and the Strong Egypt Party if it does not boycott the elections, while chances for Brotherhood candidates would be weak.
Among the revolutionary and traditional parties are the Free Egyptians Party, the Al-Wafd Party, the National Movement Party, the Conference Party, the Egyptian Democratic Party, the Reform and Development Party, the Egypt Balady Party and the Conservative Party.
It is more likely that independent male and female runners in the next elections would be more than candidates fielded by parties in a list (the law requires 56 female runners the 120 candidates of a list).
And so, a parliament fragmented in this way, with independents that are only concerned with the interests and issues of their own constituencies, would hardly be strong in light of such a balance of weakness.
Having said that, the presence of such a parliament is still better than its absence.
Edited translation from Al-Masry Al-Youm
