The 25 January Egyptian uprising was a bombshell that undid several cliches about Middle East politics. On top of the list is the “autocracy vs. Islamic obscurantism” duality that has long characterized political discourse about countries like Egypt. The secular flair of the uprising, its democratic temperament and socio-economic demands, and its civic dynamics of mobilization were outstanding and caught many observers by surprise. However, it would be equally misleading to argue that Islamism, and particularly the Muslim Brotherhood (MB), is becoming an anachronism.
Widespread claims that Islamism is a dying tendency are proving incessantly futility. A more accurate assessment would take seriously the future of the MB in post-revolutionary Egypt and place its ongoing socio-religious and organizational dynamics within the larger picture of Egypt’s changing power structure. The MB has been seriously challenged by the dramatic events of the past weeks and their well-established political modalities have been called into question. The magnitude and scope of these changes are unlikely to hinder the MB’s prospects of survival, however, provided the group responds with its most enduring historical tool: adaptability.
The full hegemony that the MB held over Egypt’s oppositional public sphere in the 1980s is now over. The group needs to chart a new formula in order to move on. A more realistic goal right now is for the MB to use its preponderant religious, social, organizational, and symbolic capital to distinguish itself within the Egyptian opposition as a “first among equals”. Compared to other Islamist actors, the MB has a lot to win if, and only if, it can move beyond the short-sighted political alliances and electoral gains that have preoccupied it in the past.
Some analysts rightly depict the MB as a key political actor whose failure to undertake internal reforms has hindered its ability to come to terms with a changing socio-political situation. They portray the 83-year-old group as bewildered in the face of a sudden reconfiguration of national politics. Nevertheless, this “crisis situation” picture does not do justice to a more nuanced reality. A relatively late-comer to the uprising, the Muslim Brotherhood remains a key beneficiary. It has come out of the upheaval with de facto state recognition and legal recognition seems very likely in the future. The MB has also cemented bridges with other opposition forces. Decades-old ideological animosities have apparently been eclipsed by an appreciation for collaboration.
When the revolutionary dust settles, Egyptian politics may become dominated by two major blocs: Islamists and non-Islamists. A badly-awaited non-Islamist democratic bloc is already in the making. A rising segment of middle class youth who spearheaded the protest movement may play an greater role in Egyptian politics. Their resourcefulness, secular sensibilities and longing for good governance, democracy and human rights can very well be the backbone for an emerging non-Islamist bloc. These youth may coalesce around reformist factions within the state as well as liberal business groups, both of which will be keen on distancing themselves from the outdated oligarchic practices that characterized state-business relations under Mubarak. An upsurge in labor militancy, especially in Lower Egyptian towns, may also create the possibility of a center-left political bloc anchored in an emerging independent trade union movement.
At the same time, democratization may be conducive to Islamists' long-term interests. The incentive of competition under a new vote-maximization system should trigger organizational and ideological reforms within the MB. The Islamist bogeyman may finally be moderated provided the MB recognizes the new political atmosphere and adjusts itself accordingly.
MB factional politics, long dubbed as “conservative vs. reformist,” may also develop in new directions. Conservatives in control of the group's Guidance Bureau are likely to throw their lot behind the army in hopes that an “orderly transition” will grant the MB king-maker status in both the process of constitutional amendments and forthcoming elections. Once the political parties’ law is amended, the MB is expected to establish the first new political party. This would be a turning point in the history of a group that has always had trouble separating politics from proselytizing. While it’s too early to tell, the MB may opt for the Jordanian model of separating its political party from proselytizing activities while keeping both under the institutional control of the group.
Brotherhood Reformists (large segments of which were on the verge of a historical splinter only two months before the uprising) believe their platform of democratizing the institutions and ideology of the group is more timely than ever. Following the model of the Moroccan Justice and Development Party, many reformists insist that a new Islamist party should tap into the needs and demands of the people, represent their interests and develop civic networks of popular political participation that are indeed separate from proselytizing activities. They will not mind maintaining ideological ties to the MB group so long as all other connections are severed.
Moreover, reformists will uphold the values of democracy and citizenship and justify them on the basis of Islam. This will require wide-scale doctrinal and organizational reforms and new understandings of political socialization within the group. In this respect, reformists are more attentive to the demands and of MB yuppies who are showing increasing signs of discontent with the status quo. The MB youth were part of the “youth bulge” in Egyptian politics. They drove their older leaders to participate in the uprising after an initial period of indecisiveness. Now, the “we-did-it” euphoria is propelling many MB youths to join the ranks of the “permanent revolution” camp that is pushing for further mass agitation. Such youth fervor can be successfully incorporated into a modern Islamist party, reformists believe.
On the other hand, splinter groups are likely to emerge if the MB’s conservative leadership does not cave into growing demands for inclusiveness. Reformists will instead establish their own Islamist political party or join the ranks of the veteran Al-Wasat party. Islamist detractors, most notably Salafists, are not likely to cause much noise in the coming period as they are arguably beyond their prime. Influenced by their strong Saudi connections, Salafists will most probably retain their ultra-conservatism that has brought them into alliances with the most unscrupulous factions of the former regime, like the security agencies and oligarchic businessmen. Under a healthier political system, this should be an invitation to irrelevancy. As for the MB, its moment of truth is fast approaching, sooner than many at the helm of the stagnant organization may have ever assumed.
